

The Establishment of Artuqid Power in Diyār Bakr in the Twelfth Century

Author(s): Carole Hillenbrand

Source: *Studia Islamica*, No. 54 (1981), pp. 129-153

Published by: [Maisonneuve & Larose](#)

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1595383>

Accessed: 17-03-2015 01:35 UTC

---

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at  
<http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.



Maisonneuve & Larose is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to *Studia Islamica*.

<http://www.jstor.org>

# THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ARTUQID POWER IN DIYĀR BAKR IN THE TWELFTH CENTURY

---

## I. Introduction

The most important events in the life of the Artuqid ruler Najm al-Dīn Il-Ghāzī are well known. In particular, his victory over Roger of Antioch in 513/1119 at Balāṭ and his ill-starred campaign into Georgia in 515/1121 are recorded in the majority of contemporary chronicles. Little attention has, however, been paid to the immediate successors of Il-Ghāzī who established themselves in Diyār Bakr after his death in 516/1122. The purpose of this article is to provide a fuller account than has hitherto been available of the careers of Il-Ghāzī's two most important sons and to comment on their wider significance in the history of the Jazīra in the twelfth century.

The major work on the early Artuqids remains a pioneer article by Claude Cahen published in 1935.<sup>(1)</sup> In this work Cahen sketched the major political outlines of the reigns of the first three Artuqid rulers—Il-Ghāzī, Temūr-Tash and Najm

(1) "Le Diyār Bakr au temps des premiers Urtukides", *Journal Asiatique* CCXXVII (1935), 219-76. Little that is new is added in the relevant chapters of O. Turan, *Doğu Anadolu Türk Devletleri Tarihi* (Istanbul, 1973). A. Sevim's article "Temürtaş' in Halep hâkimiyeti", *Bellefen* XXV, Sayı 100 (1961), 571-81, is of limited relevance here since it does not deal with Temūr-Tash's later activities in Diyār Bakr.

al-Dīn Alpī—covering the period 500-570/1106-1175. In so doing he established for the first time the basic chronology of this confused period in the history of the Jazīra. The broad scope of his article, however, necessarily precluded a more detailed examination of the activities of any one of these significant rulers. The present article is intended to fill at least part of that gap by considering the thirty years' reign of Temūr-Tash, a period which saw the gradual consolidation of Artuqid rule in this area.

The most important source for the history of the Artuqids is the town chronicle of Mayyāfāriqīn, the *Tārīkh Mayyāfāriqīn wa Āmid* of Ibn al-Azraq al-Fāriqī. The value of this work as a source for the history of the Jazīra, Northern Syria and Iraq has long been recognised. Amedroz<sup>(1)</sup> and Minorsky<sup>(2)</sup> were the first to use the text and Amedroz transcribed some relevant sections of the text in the footnotes to his edition of Ibn al-Qalānisi.<sup>(3)</sup> Minorsky analysed and translated the account by Ibn al-Azraq of Il-Ghāzī's campaign to Tiflis in 515/1121<sup>(4)</sup> and Cahen drew heavily on the *Tārīkh Mayyāfāriqīn* for his 1935 article. When Amedroz first wrote about Ibn al-Azraq's history, the text was known in only two manuscript versions, both of which are in the British Library. These are catalogued under the numbers Or. 5803 and Or. 6310. No further copies of the text have subsequently come to light.

The section of the text concerned with Marwānid history has been edited and published by 'Awaḍ.<sup>(5)</sup> More recently, Ibn al-Azraq's account of the reigns of Il-Ghāzī and Temūr-Tash was edited and translated, with commentary, by the present author as part of an unpublished doctoral thesis.<sup>(6)</sup>

(1) H. F. Amedroz, "Three Arabic MSS. on the History of the City of Mayyāfāriqīn", *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1902, 785-812.

(2) V. F. Minorsky, "Caucasica in the History of Mayyāfāriqīn", *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* XIII/4 (1949), 27-35.

(3) Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhail tārikh Dimashq*, ed. H. F. Amedroz (Leiden, 1908).

(4) *Op. cit.*

(5) Ibn al-Azraq, *Tārīkh al-Fāriqī*, ed. B. A. L. 'Awaḍ, rev. M. S. Ghorbal (Cairo, 1959).

(6) C. Hillenbrand, *The history of the Jazīra 1100-1150: the contribution of Ibn al-Azraq al-Fāriqī*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh, 1979).

II. *The succession problem*

The sources<sup>(1)</sup> are generally agreed that at the death of Il-Ghāzī in 516/1122-3, his son Sulaimān inherited Mayyāfāriqīn whilst another son, Temūr-Tash, succeeded him at Mārdīn. Aleppo, which Il-Ghāzī also ruled at the time of his death, fell to his nephew, Badr al-Daula Sulaimān b. ‘Abd al-Jabbār.<sup>(2)</sup>

Behind this apparently straightforward division of territories, however, there remain several unresolved issues which deserve further discussion and on which the *Tārīkh Mayyāfāriqīn wa Āmid* sheds some new light.

According to Ibn al-Azraq, Temūr-Tash b. Il-Ghāzī stayed behind in Mārdīn with his *atābeg* whilst Il-Ghāzī attempted to make the journey to Mayyāfāriqīn with his wife and Sulaimān.<sup>(3)</sup> Temūr-Tash experienced no serious difficulties in assuming

(1) In this article, the following abbreviations have been used:

*Anonymous Syriac Chronicle* A. S. Tritton, "The First and Second Crusades from an Anonymous Syriac Chronicle", with notes by H. A. R. Gibb, *JRAS* 1933, 69-101, 273-305.

‘Awaḍ *Tārīkh al-Fāriqī*, ed. B. A. L. ‘Awaḍ, revised M. S. Ghorbal (Cairo, 1959). al-‘Azīmī, "Chronique" C. Cahen, ed., "La chronique abrégée d'al-‘Azīmī", *JA* CCXXX (1938), 353-448.

Bundārī, *Zubdat Zubdat al-nuṣra wa nukhbat al-‘uṣra*, ed. M. T. Houtsma (Leiden, 1889).

Ibn al-‘Adīm, *Bughyat Bughyat al-ḥalab fī tārīkh Ḥalab*, ed. A. Sevim (Ankara, 1976).

— *Zubdat Zubdat al-ḥalab min tārīkh Ḥalab* II, ed. S. Dahan (Damascus, 1954).

Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil X al-Kāmil fī l-Tārīkh X*, ed. C. J. Tornberg (Leiden and Uppsala, 1864).

— , *Atābegs Tārīkh al-daula al-atābakiyya*, ed. A. Ṭulaimāt (Cairo, 1963).

Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A British Library Ms. Or. 5803.

— , Ms. B British Library Ms. Or. 6310.

Ibn al-Furāt, *Duwal Tārīkh al-duwal wa’l-mulūk*, Vienna MS A.F. 811.

Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhail Dhail tārīkh Dimashq*, ed. H. F. Amedroz (Leiden, 1908).

Ibn Shaddād, *Jazīra al-A’lāq al-khaṭīra*, Bodleian Ms. Marsh 333.

Matthew of Edessa, *Chronique Palmul’iwn*, tr. E. Dulaurier (Paris, 1858).

Michael the Syrian, *Chronique Chronique de Michel le Syrien*, tr. J.-B. Chabot (Paris, 1899-1914).

Sibt b. al-Jauzī, *Mir’āt Mir’āt al-zamān*, ed. (anon.), Hyderābād, 1951.

Usāma, *Memoirs Memoirs of an Arab-Syrian Gentleman*, tr. P. K. Hitti (repr. Beirut, 1964).

(2) Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhail*, 208; *Anonymous Syriac Chronicle*, 89; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 218; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 426.

(3) Ms. A, f. 162b; Ms. B, f. 105a.

control of the Artuqid possession of Mārdīn on the news of his father's death, since he already held the citadel. Besides, it would appear likely that Il-Ghāzī's hold over that city was firm and that he felt a definite attachment to it. The sources frequently mention that Il-Ghāzī regularly returned to Mārdīn for rest or reinforcements<sup>(1)</sup> and he must have regarded it as his real base. He had held Mārdīn from around 502/1108-9.

The situation at Mayyāfāriqīn was markedly different. Since Ibn Jahīr had wrested Mayyāfāriqīn from its Marwānid overlord in 478/1085-6<sup>(2)</sup> the city had been prey to a long succession of rulers, to the detriment of its economic and social welfare. The date of the beginning of Il-Ghāzī's rule at Mayyāfāriqīn is given by Ibn al-Azraq as 14 Jumādā II 512.<sup>(3)</sup> Ibn al-Athīr, however, writes that Il-Ghāzī was awarded the city as an *iqḷā'* by Sultan Maḥmūd as late as 515/1121-2.<sup>(4)</sup>

Whatever the actual date of Il-Ghāzī's acquisition of Mayyāfāriqīn, and even if Ibn al-Azraq's much earlier date is accepted, Il-Ghāzī did not have the opportunity to spend enough time in the city to consolidate his position there. An analysis of his activities during the years 512-516/1118-22 reveals that he could not possibly have accorded Mayyāfāriqīn more than a passing interest.<sup>(5)</sup>

Ibn al-Azraq's history contains a most interesting anecdote in which he describes the subterfuge employed by the widow and son of Il-Ghāzī in order to gain access to the citadel of Mayyāfāriqīn.<sup>(6)</sup> On their arrival by night outside the gate of the city, the dead body of Il-Ghāzī was put on his horse. The *wālī* of the city opened the gate and only when the retinue had reached the very centre of the citadel was the death of Il-Ghāzī made known.

(1) Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 389; Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *Dhail*, 200.

(2) 'Awaḍ, 212; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 93-4.

(3) Ms. A, f. 161a; Ms. B, f. 101a.

(4) Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 418. If Ibn al-Athīr's date is to be trusted, the granting of the city of Mayyāfāriqīn to Il-Ghāzī by the sultan may well have been merely the formal recognition of a *de facto* situation which had already existed for several years.

(5) This was a period when Il-Ghāzī was deeply involved in Aleppan affairs.

(6) Ms. A, f. 162b; Ms. B, f. 105a.

Ruses of this kind, which concealed the death of a sovereign or an important leader, were far from rare in this period and were often the work of women who wanted to secure the succession for their sons or some other favourite.<sup>(1)</sup> In this particular instance, Il-Ghāzī's widow was helped by the fact that she was near Mayyāfāriqīn and that she and Sulaimān could travel there with the body by night. Had Il-Ghāzī died further from his seat of power, her ruse might well have failed.

The *khatun* had every reason to doubt that Sulaimān would be warmly welcomed as the new ruler of Mayyāfāriqīn and to be aware of the need to secure the citadel before announcing the death of Il-Ghāzī. There is no reason to assume that Il-Ghāzī had behaved towards the inhabitants of Mayyāfāriqīn in a more lenient way than any of that city's earlier overlords. His treatment of the inhabitants of Aleppo and the villages and countryside of Northern Syria shows him to have been a child of his times and casts considerable doubt on the veracity of the eulogistic account of him given by Ibn al-Azraq.<sup>(2)</sup> It cannot therefore be assumed that the people of Mayyāfāriqīn would automatically have welcomed a son of his as their new ruler.

Quite apart from this consideration, it is not at all certain that Il-Ghāzī had in fact appointed Sulaimān as his successor in Mayyāfāriqīn. Indeed, Michael the Syrian expressly states that Il-Ghāzī ordered that his son Temür-Tash should rule after him; but as the latter was not present at the time, Il-Ghāzī's son Sulaimān, who was with him, accompanied him to Mayyāfāriqīn and when he died *en route* buried him in that city. He then ruled there.<sup>(3)</sup>

Sulaimān's succession at Mayyāfāriqīn may well have been effected in spite of the wishes of his father, whose attitude towards him at this time is unclear. The sources agree that

(1) A famous incident of this kind involved the widow of Malik-Shāh, Terken Khatun, who concealed the death of her husband in 485/1092-3 (Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 142-5). She did not, however, resort to the same extremes as Il-Ghāzī's widow.

(2) Ibn al-Azraq, *Ms. A*, f. 161a.

(3) Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 218.

Sulaimān, who had been left in Aleppo by Il-Ghāzī to manage affairs there, rebelled against his father in 515/1121-2, the year before Il-Ghāzī died. The precise nature of this revolt is not clear and Ibn al-ʿAdīm, who describes it in great detail, gives a very confusing account. <sup>(1)</sup>

Ibn al-Athīr relates that in 515/1121-2 Sulaimān, egged on by bad advisers, rebelled against his father at Aleppo. Il-Ghāzī rushed there, seized his son, who was full of excuses, and meted out terrible punishments to his accomplices. <sup>(2)</sup> Ibn al-ʿAdīm, on the other hand, gives two accounts of the rebellion. The one relates that Sulaimān was displeased with the demands made on him by his father and rose up against him. During Il-Ghāzī's absence on his ill-starred campaign into Georgia, Sulaimān expelled various *amīrs* from Aleppo and imposed his own corrupt, despotic rule on the city. <sup>(3)</sup> The other account given by Ibn al-ʿAdīm describes how Il-Ghāzī wrote to his son asking him to stage an apparent "rebellion" in order to free Il-Ghāzī from the obligation of giving Aleppo to Dubais b. Ṣadaqa, as he had rashly promised to do while on the Tiflīs campaign. Sulaimān, who was of feckless temperament, actually did rebel. Il-Ghāzī reached Qalʿat Jaʿbar and there met messengers from Sulaimān imploring his pardon. <sup>(4)</sup>

The opportunistic timing of the uprising, the speed with which Il-Ghāzī suppressed it, and the details of the torture which he inflicted on Sulaimān's confederates, all support the theory that Sulaimān acted of his own accord. On the other hand, Dubais was undoubtedly interested in acquiring Aleppo, as subsequent events proved, <sup>(5)</sup> so there may have been some germ of truth in the Tiflīs story.

Whether Sulaimān's rebellion was genuine or rigged, he was removed by his father from his position at Aleppo and replaced there by Il-Ghāzī's nephew, Badr al-Daula Sulaimān b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār. According to Ibn al-Athīr, Il-Ghāzī yielded to his

(1) Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Zubdat*, 200-2.

(2) Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, 417-8.

(3) Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Zubdat*, 200.

(4) *Ibid.*, 200-2.

(5) Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Bughyat*, 228-9.

paternal feelings and spared his son's life. Sulaimān fled soon afterwards to Damascus and took refuge with Togh-Tegin, the father of the *khatun*. Togh-Tegin interceded on Sulaimān's behalf but to no avail.<sup>(1)</sup> Ibn al-Furāt also emphasises that Il-Ghāzī could not forgive Sulaimān.<sup>(2)</sup>

In his forays against the Franks during the last year of his life, Il-Ghāzī turned increasingly to another nephew, Balak, who was to prove his real successor in Northern Syria until his premature death in 518/1124.<sup>(3)</sup> It was to Balak that Il-Ghāzī entrusted his two sons, Sulaimān and Temūr-Tash, at his death.<sup>(4)</sup> This statement by Matthew of Edessa and the presence of Sulaimān with Il-Ghāzī on his last journey to Mayyāfāriqīn would suggest that some kind of reconciliation had actually taken place between them. Indeed, the fact that Il-Ghāzī was prepared to undertake the journey from Mārdīn to Mayyāfāriqīn at all might be interpreted as a last effort by a dying man to assert his presence in a city of whose loyalty he was unconvinced and thereby to ensure the succession of his son Sulaimān there.

Conversely, the presence of Sulaimān by Il-Ghāzī's side might be construed as the action of a son waiting to profit from his father's impending death and making certain that he was on the spot. This could have been his own idea or that of the *khatun*, who may well have been the motivating force behind their entry into Mayyāfāriqīn. Ibn al-'Adīm describes Sulaimān as feckless and his short-lived rule at Aleppo as despotic.<sup>(5)</sup> He was very young and easily swayed by the evil counsels of his entourage.

Thus the events which immediately preceded the entry of Sulaimān into Mayyāfāriqīn and his acquisition of its citadel in 516/1122-3 cast an interesting light on the dangerous ruse which he and the *khatun* practised. They also explain to a

(1) Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 418.

(2) Ibn al-Furāt, I, f. 179b (*apud* Cahen, "Diyār Bakr", 241).

(3) Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zundat*, 219; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 436; al-'Aẓīmī, "Chronique", 394.

(4) Matthew of Edessa, *Chronique*, 307.

(5) Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat*, 200.



certain extent the necessity of such a ploy. It is ironic that, after these elaborate manoeuvres and the eventually successful outcome of the subterfuge, Sulaimān was to enjoy only a shortlived rule in Mayyāfāriqīn.

### III. *Shams al-Daula Sulaimān at Mayyāfāriqīn, 516-518/1122-4*

Little is known of the short reign of Sulaimān at Mayyāfāriqīn. The known facts come from Ibn al-Furāt, Michael the Syrian and Ibn al-Azraq. Had Sulaimān lived longer, he would probably have pursued more aggressive policies than his brother, Temür-Tash, at Mārdīn. Indeed, there are signs that Sulaimān had territorial ambitions, not only in the immediate area of Mayyāfāriqīn but probably as far as Malatya.

Sulaimān took Haza from his cousin, Dā'ūd, villages around Mayyāfāriqīn from Qurtī, the ruler of Arzan, and—more significantly—he seized Khartabirt from Balak,<sup>(1)</sup> either while Balak was absent on campaign or at his death in Rabi' I 518/May 1124. Sulaimān's marriage to a daughter of Sultan Qilich Arslan of Malatya, which is recorded by Ibn al-Azraq,<sup>(2)</sup> may well have been prompted by a desire on the part of Sulaimān to emulate his more successful cousin, Balak, who had also allied himself to the Saljūqs of Rūm and acquired more power thereby.<sup>(3)</sup>

The proximity of Sulaimān's brother, Temür-Tash, who now held the citadel at Mārdīn, did not present problems initially. Ibn al-Qalānisi relates that at first the two brothers remained friendly.<sup>(4)</sup> Relations between them were still harmonious as late as Rajab 518/September 1124 when, according to Ibn al-'Adīm, Temür-Tash (who had become disastrously enmeshed in Aleppan affairs) left to go to Diyār Bakr to fetch help from his brother, Sulaimān.<sup>(5)</sup>

(1) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 162b; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 211; Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat*, 220.

(2) Ms. A, f. 162b.

(3) Balak had married the widow of the Saljūq ruler of Malatya and had become *atābeg* to her son (Turan, *op. cit.*, 147).

(4) Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhail*, 208.

(5) Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat*, 223.

Ibn al-Qalānīsī records that later on a quarrel arose between the two brothers "which lasted because of both their faults".<sup>(1)</sup> It would have been comparatively easy for harmony between them to be maintained when Temūr-Tash was often away from Mārdīn in the service of Balak<sup>(2)</sup> and it is not surprising that dissension really began when Temūr-Tash returned to Diyār Bakr and no doubt interfered in the territorial ambitions of his brother. Ibn al-Furāt in fact implies that Sulaimān was preparing to attack Temūr-Tash.<sup>(3)</sup> Whatever the cause of the rift between the two brothers, Temūr-Tash considered it more important to remain at Mārdīn than to answer numerous urgent summons for him to return to Aleppo.

A month or so after the departure of Temūr-Tash from Aleppo to Mārdīn, Sulaimān died most opportunely in Ramaḍān 518/October-November 1124<sup>(4)</sup> at Mayyāfāriqīn. This may not have been a mere coincidence. The predictable struggle for hegemony in Diyār Bakr between the two brothers was best settled by the death of one of them. Any complicity on the part of Temūr-Tash in his brother's death must, however, remain a matter for speculation, especially since Ibn al-Azraq's testimony favours Temūr-Tash throughout and the author would have suppressed any evidence which might reflect badly on his former master.

Sulaimān does not emerge from the sources as an especially admirable figure. Aside from Ibn al-Azraq's biased evidence,<sup>(5)</sup> Ibn al-'Adīm confirms that Sulaimān was frivolous and a trouble-maker.<sup>(6)</sup> Temūr-Tash may have lacked the flamboyant vigour of his father but he possessed the tenacity and adaptability necessary to stay in the area of Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn for thirty years.

(1) Ibn al-Qalānīsī, *loc. cit.*

(2) Cf. p. 139, *infra*.

(3) Cahen, "Diyār Bakr", 241.

(4) Ms. A, f. 163a.

(5) Cf. Ibn al-Azraq's description of the depraved son of Sulaimān, Maḥmūd, where the author savours with obvious relish the details of this "black sheep" of the Artuqid family (Ms. A, f. 163a).

(6) Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat*, 200.

#### IV. *The sources for the reign of Temür-Tash at Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn*

It is not the intention in this article to discuss year by year the detailed events in the period of Temür-Tash's reign at Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn. It seems appropriate, instead, to attempt to impose some order and, if possible, interpretations on the wealth of detailed incidents mentioned in Ibn al-Azraq and other chronicles.

The major sources for the rule of Temür-Tash at Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn are Ibn al-Azraq's text and the *History of the Atābegs of Mosul* by Ibn al-Athīr. These two works form an interesting foil to one another; the one is highly biased in favour of Temür-Tash and the other sets out to eulogise the achievements of Zangī and his descendants. Both these works often treat the same historical events but because of the very different slant placed on them by their authors the narratives vary markedly. As well as these two major sources for the history of Diyār Bakr during the thirty years that Temür-Tash ruled, some events of the period are also mentioned by Michael the Syrian, Ibn al-Furāt, al-'Azīmī and Ibn al-'Adīm. None of these sources have the particular bias of Ibn al-Azraq or of Ibn al-Athīr and they can therefore in some measure be used as a control.

Ibn al-Azraq's testimony on the reign of Temür-Tash is especially valuable for its occasional references to institutions and to the social and economic life of the time. Such references are all too rare and are often only partially explained but they provide information which is not found elsewhere. Ibn al-Athīr's *History of the Atābegs of Mosul*, on the other hand, sheds a fascinating light on the relationship between Temür-Tash and Zangī. This work provides detailed information on the figure who dominated most of Temür-Tash's reign and who even on the pages of a tacitly hostile source such as Ibn al-Azraq's history is mentioned almost as often as Temür-Tash himself.

### V. *The early career of Temür-Tash b. Il-Ghāzī*

Although Il-Ghāzī had a number of sons, Sulaimān and Temür-Tash are the only two who play a significant role in Ibn al-Azraq's history. The reason for this is simple: Il-Ghāzī's other sons had all predeceased him. <sup>(1)</sup> Sulaimān and Temür-Tash were still apparently quite young when their father died in 516/1122-3. <sup>(2)</sup> During Il-Ghāzī's lifetime, Temür-Tash had despite his youth performed two useful tasks for his father. He had been left in Aleppo by Il-Ghāzī in 511/1117-8 while the latter went back to Mārdīn to collect reinforcements. <sup>(3)</sup> On another occasion, in 515/1111-2, Temür-Tash had been sent by his father to Sultan Maḥmūd to intercede on behalf of Dubais. <sup>(4)</sup>

On the death of Il-Ghāzī, Temür-Tash acquired possession of Mārdīn without difficulty. The next two years, 516-518/1122-4, he spent in the service of his energetic cousin, Balak, to whose care his father had entrusted him before he died. Temür-Tash was present at Balak's siege of Manbij in 518/1124. Indeed, Balak was preparing to leave Temür-Tash in charge of the siege at Manbij when he was killed outside the walls of the town. <sup>(5)</sup> Significantly, at his death Balak bequeathed his estates to Temür-Tash <sup>(6)</sup> who proceeded to Aleppo and took possession of it in Rabī' I 518/May 1124. <sup>(7)</sup>

Temür-Tash has received much opprobrium for his short administration at Aleppo. Stevenson calls him "incompetent" <sup>(8)</sup> whilst Gibb writes that Aleppo had reached the climax of its misfortunes "since it was now reduced to dependence on

(1) Cf. the attached genealogical table.

(2) According to Ibn al-Athīr, Temür-Tash was seventeen in 515/1111-2 (*Kāmil*, X, 418).

(3) Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhail*, 199; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 373; Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat*, 180; al-'Azīmi, "Chronique", 197.

According to the last two sources, Temür-Tash was left in Aleppo as a hostage.

(4) Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 418.

(5) G. Weil, *Geschichte der Chalifen* III (Mannheim, 1851), 240.

(6) Matthew of Edessa, *Chronique*, 312.

(7) Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat*, 220.

(8) W. B. Stevenson, *The Crusaders in the East* (Cambridge, 1907), 111.

Il-Ghāzī's indolent son and successor at Mardin, Timurtash''.<sup>(1)</sup> There is certainly ample evidence for a number of blunders and for a marked lack of judgement on the part of Temūr-Tash at this time. His release of Baldwin was based on the perhaps naive assumption that Baldwin would keep his word. Far from doing so, Baldwin refused to comply with the terms of the agreement made with Temūr-Tash and even allied himself with Dubais although he had specifically promised not to do so. After a humiliating defeat outside Aleppo at the hands of Dubais, Temūr-Tash withdrew to Mārdīn to try to obtain help from his brother, Sulaimān,<sup>(2)</sup> and left Aleppo to its fate.

Whilst Temūr-Tash's brief attempt at governing Aleppo was far from glorious, his own contribution to the city's decline may well have been exaggerated. Aleppo was notoriously difficult to rule and a boy of eighteen was scarcely the ideal person to be in charge of it. His preferred *modus operandi* in his later life was negotiation rather than ruse or the use of military strength, but at Aleppo in 518/1124 he lacked the experience and advisers to deal with such seasoned practitioners of the political art as Baldwin.

Aleppo at this particular juncture was coveted by several powerful *amīrs* or groups—Dubais, who might justifiably have expected to receive the city as a reward for his loyalty to the Artuqids; the dispossessed Badr al-Daula, still smarting from the humiliation of being dismissed from his governorship of the city by Balak; and, as always, the Franks. The various conflicting interests of these factions exerted a continuous pressure on Temūr-Tash, who must soon have felt out of his depth in Aleppo.

Once he had arrived back at Mārdīn, Temūr-Tash embarked on policies which furthered his own modest territorial ambitions in that area and he seems deliberately to have turned his back on Aleppo. This attitude on the part of Temūr-Tash is

(1) H. A. R. Gibb, "Zengi and the Fall of Edessa" in K. M. Setton and M. W. Baldwin, eds., *A History of the Crusades. I. The First Hundred Years* (Madison, Milwaukee and London, 1969), 452.

(2) Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat*, 220-3.

severely condemned by Ibn al-ʿAdīm, who as the town-chronicler of Aleppo naturally sees Temūr-Tash's actions in an adverse light and condemns his preoccupation with the affairs of Diyār Bakr to the exclusion of Aleppo. <sup>(1)</sup> When messengers arrived from Aleppo to Mārdīn in 518/1124, Temūr-Tash temporised with them, absorbed as he was with the death of his brother Sulaimān and his own acquisition of the town of Mayyāfāriqīn. He even went so far as to imprison the Aleppan envoys, who escaped and sought help for their city from another source, Aq-Sonqur al-Bursuqī from Mosul. <sup>(2)</sup>

The involvement of Temūr-Tash in the affairs of Aleppo was a singular failure. With a crass political blunder and a military defeat behind him, he retreated into the area of Mārdīn which his father, Il-Ghāzī, had always regarded as his home base.

Thus ended the unsatisfactory bolstering of Aleppo by the Turcoman forces of Diyār Bakr, a process which had begun in 511/1117-8. Thereafter Temūr-Tash rarely occupied himself with political affairs outside the immediate area of Diyār Bakr. He owed his tenure of Aleppo, in any case, to the bequest of Balak rather than to his own efforts to expand his territory. In this respect, he is to be contrasted with his father, whose ambition extended well beyond Aleppo. It may be concluded that Temūr-Tash was temperamentally unsuited for the life of virtually ceaseless campaigning which the older generation of his family had led.

Viewed from the vantage-point of medieval Islamic history as a whole, this decision to withdraw to Diyār Bakr marks the end of the uncoordinated but grandiose Artuqid territorial ambitions which had prompted Il-Ghāzī and his father Artuq before him to cover vast stretches of the Islamic world. As far as the livelihood of the Artuqid family was concerned,

(1) Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Zubdat*, 225.

(2) Ibn al-ʿAdīm, *Bughyat*, 204-7.

Ibn al-Azraq's own reticence on this whole incident may well spring from ignorance. More probably, it is the result of a desire on his part to suppress evidence which is unfavourable to the Artuqid dynasty. Cf. Ms. A, f. 163a.

however, Temür-Tash's decision to retreat to the remote, difficult terrain of Diyār Bakr could be judged as realistic and astute.

On the death of his brother, Sulaimān, Temür-Tash took possession of Mayyāfāriqīn <sup>(1)</sup> and ruled the two cities jointly for thirty years.

## VI. *The reign of Temür-Tash until the death of Zangī in 541/1146*

Whilst Temür-Tash ruled at Mārdīn from 516/1122 and at Mayyāfāriqīn from 518/1124-5, his cousin Dā'ūd had governed Ḥiṣn Kaifā since around 502/1108-9. Dā'ūd had been prepared to accept the overall leadership of Il-Ghāzī and had furnished him with troops on occasion. He was not, however, likely to allow Temür-Tash to dominate him in similar fashion. It is true that Temür-Tash succeeded in seizing Mayyāfāriqīn before Dā'ūd but this was one of the few occasions when he independently outwitted his more bellicose and enterprising cousin.

Ibn al-Azraq never explicitly states that Dā'ūd had the upper hand in his relationship with Temür-Tash but stresses in unusually emotive terms the savagery with which Dā'ūd pillaged and plundered. Ibn al-Athīr, on the other hand, who has no reason to take sides between the two Artuqids, clearly implies that it was Dā'ūd, not Temür-Tash, who presented the real threat to Zangī's aspirations in Diyār Bakr and that Dā'ūd had inherited that much-prized ability to inspire devotion in the Turcomans which Il-Ghāzī had possessed before him. According to Ibn al-Athīr, Zangī would have been kept busy if his only adversary had been Dā'ūd, who enjoyed such prestige with the Turcomans that all those capable of carrying arms would join him. Ibn al-Athīr admires Dā'ūd's resilience and his ability to return to fight only a few days after a crushing defeat. <sup>(2)</sup>

(1) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 162b.

(2) *Atābegs*, 81.

In the early years of Temür-Tash's reign, Dā'ūd seized the territories formerly held by Balak, such as Khartabirt,<sup>(1)</sup> and even participated with the ruler of Akhlāṭ in a campaign against the Georgians.<sup>(2)</sup> Any further ambitions Dā'ūd may have had were soon, however, laid aside in the face of the threat of Zangī who was made governor of Mosul in 520/1126. The incipient rivalry between Dā'ūd and his cousin Temür-Tash was forgotten at the prospect of a common foe who was preparing to invade their territories.

Once Zangī had established himself at Mosul, his first act of aggression was to lay siege that same year (520/1126) to Naṣībīn, which belonged to Temür-Tash. Temür-Tash appealed to Dā'ūd for help against Zangī and this was promised him. After a well-known incident involving Zangī's interception of a pigeon carrying a message from Temür-Tash to the governor of Naṣībīn, Zangī tricked the garrison of the town into surrendering it to him.<sup>(3)</sup>

This initial act by Zangī united the Artuqids and together they came to an agreement in 524/1130 with Il-aldī, the ruler of Āmid, and other Turcoman chiefs to defend their territories against Zangī. In spite of their large numbers, the combined Artuqid forces were defeated by Zangī who took Dārā and Sarja.<sup>(4)</sup>

After this defeat at the hands of Zangī, the uneasy alliance between the two Artuqid cousins was at an end. There are signs that each of them reverted to their own natural mode of government; Temür-Tash consolidated his hold on the two cities under his command, whilst Dā'ūd energetically raised his sights to new conquests. The year after the defeat at Sarja, Dā'ūd seized several citadels south of Lake Van.<sup>(5)</sup>

It would appear that Temür-Tash was worried by the implications of Dā'ūd's actions and that he sought a new

(1) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 163b.

(2) Matthew of Edessa, *Chronique*, 146.

(3) Ibn al-Athīr, *Atābegs*, 36-7.

(4) *Ibid.*, 38-9; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 240; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 467.

(5) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, ff. 164a-b. These citadels included Qaṭalbas and Bātāsā, as well as the important town of Is'ird.



protector. It is not clear whether he first approached Zangī or whether Zangī suggested an alliance with him. Even if their future collaboration was at Temūr-Tash's instigation, Zangī dominated the relationship from the outset and knew how to exploit the rivalry between the two Artuqid cousins to his own advantage. Zangī and Temūr-Tash clashed with Dā'ūd outside Āmid in 528/1134 and Dā'ūd was defeated. Zangī then went on to take the citadel of al-Ṣūr which he handed over to Temūr-Tash.<sup>(1)</sup> Although Ibn al-Azraq is silent at this point, al-'Azīmī clearly states that Temūr-Tash had become Zangī's vassal.<sup>(2)</sup>

Zangī's gift of this citadel and other relatively unimportant possessions to Temūr-Tash was a clever move on his part since he thereby weakened both Dā'ūd and Temūr-Tash. Temūr-Tash, well-pleased for a brief moment with his new possessions but not dangerously strengthened by them, could not enjoy for long the security afforded him by his new-found protector who spent only short periods in Diyār Bakr. Once Zangī had gone away, Dā'ūd, enraged by his loss of territories and Temūr-Tash's agreement with Sangī, terrified Temūr-Tash to such an extent that in 530/1135-6 he even demolished the *rabaḍ* and another suburb of his own city of Mayyāfāriqīn, presumably because he felt unable to defend them against the depredations of his cousin.<sup>(3)</sup> By setting the two Artuqids against one another, Zangī cleverly kept them occupied in Diyār Bakr and successfully diverted Dā'ūd's energies away from Zangī's own sphere of influence.

Temūr-Tash had now tried to join forces with both Zangī and Dā'ūd. In neither case had the alliance brought him significant advantages. In spite of the coalition with Dā'ūd, Temūr-Tash had lost Naṣībīn and when he had subsequently thrown in his lot with Zangī, this had resulted in an exacerbation

(1) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 168a; Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhail*, 243; Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat*, 253; Ibn Shaddād, *Jazīra*, f. 133b; Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, XI, 6-7; Usāma, *Memoirs*, 185-6.

(2) Al-'Azīmī, "Chronique", 408.

(3) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 168a.

of the hostility between himself and Dā'ūd. From 530/1135-6 onwards, Temūr-Tash was formally attached to neither of his two rivals. For a decade he played a pragmatic but dangerous game of shifting alliances and no doubt careful diplomacy. The sources are silent on the exact details of his policies toward Dā'ūd and Zangī but the results of his unobtrusive stance were successful. By the end of 541/1146-7, both Dā'ūd and Zangī were dead. Temūr-Tash was still alive and still had possession of the two cities of Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn. His waiting game had proved worth while.

Before Zangī's death in 541/1146, their relationship had seriously deteriorated. One event which sparked off a quarrel between them occurred in 533/1138-9 when the governor of Naṣībīn, Abū Bakr, fled to Temūr-Tash for protection from Zangī. Zangī, whose brutality and iron discipline<sup>(1)</sup> were legendary, asked for Abū Bakr to be handed over to him.<sup>(2)</sup> When Temūr-Tash refused, Zangī came to Mārdīn. Temūr-Tash extricated himself from this dangerous situation by conceding Dārā to Zangī, as well as giving his daughter in marriage;<sup>(3)</sup> but—if Ibn al-Azraq is to be believed—he did not yield up Abū Bakr.

The agreement reached in 536/1141-2 between Dā'ūd and Temūr-Tash probably prompted Zangī's demand to Temūr-Tash to send his chief official, Ḥabashī, to him.<sup>(4)</sup> Zangī's motives remain unknown but the incident ended with the assassination of Ḥabashī at Zangī's camp.

Temūr-Tash could not fail to be worried by the sudden expansion of Zangī's lands immediately after the death of Dā'ūd in 539/1144-5, when Zangī seized nearly all Dā'ūd's territories.<sup>(5)</sup> Ibn al-Azraq comments at this point that Temūr-Tash and Zangī quarrelled but he gives no details.<sup>(6)</sup>

(1) E.g. Bundārī, *Zubdat*, 205.

(2) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 176b.

(3) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 169a; al-'Azīmī, "Chronique", 417; 'Ibn al-'Adīm, *Zubdat*, 271.

(4) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 170a.

(5) *Ibid.*

(6) *Ibid.*

Even before Dā'ūd's death, there are signs that Temūr-Tash sought an alliance with Dā'ūd and Joscelin, the Frankish ruler of Edessa, <sup>(1)</sup> since Zangī was approaching the height of his power and was not prepared to brook resistance from his former vassal. In 540/1145-6 Zangī came as far as Tall al-Shaikh and threatened the town of Mayyāfāriqīn <sup>(2)</sup> before withdrawing. Presumably this was a demonstration of strength on his part, intended to intimidate Temūr-Tash. It was exceedingly fortunate for the latter that very soon afterwards, in 541/1146, Zangī himself was assassinated at Qal'at Ja'bar.

With the removal in the space of two years of his two main rivals who had constantly harassed and restricted him, Temūr-Tash suddenly found himself free to act in a more independent way than hitherto, especially since he himself had now been in power for a long period.

As already noted, by the end of Zangī's career a degree of personal animosity had crept into his relationship with Temūr-Tash. Indeed, relations between them resembled those between a lion and a mouse. Ibn al-Athīr sheds very interesting light on this. Several farmers had left Mosul to go to Mārdīn. Zangī was annoyed by this and asked Temūr-Tash to send them back. Temūr-Tash refused, saying that he treated farmers well, taking only one-tenth of their crops, and that if Zangī had done likewise, the farmers would not have left his territory. Zangī's reply to this gesture of defiance was characteristically chilling: <sup>(3)</sup>

"Tell your master that if he took (only) a one-hundredth share, that would be a large amount for him, occupied as he is with his pleasures in the citadel at Mārdīn... If it had not been for me, he would long since have ceased to drink water safely

(1) *Anonymous Syriac Chronicle*, 280.

(2) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 171a.

(3) Even a favourable source such as Ibn al-Athīr abounds in such anecdotes which testify to Zangī's cruelty and ability to inspire terror. Bundāri goes even further in his description of Zangī, calling him a "tyrant, striking at random, and a raging blast of calamities, tigerish in nature, lion-like in malevolence... feared for his violence... the death of his enemies and of his subjects" (Gibb, "Zengi", 457, n. 10, quoting Bundāri, *Zubdat*, 205).

at Mārdīn and the Franks would have taken it » (the city).<sup>(1)</sup> Temūr-Tash sent back the farmers.

## VII. *Temūr-Tash at the height of his power, 541-8/1146-53*

According to Ibn al-Azraq, Temūr-Tash reacted with joyful alacrity to the news of Zangī's death. He left his garden immediately and seized a number of neighbouring territories, such as Ḥānī and Sīwān.<sup>(2)</sup> Such speed was imperative if the citadels were to be captured before Zangī's successor at Mosul, his son Saif al-Dīn Ghāzī, could establish himself and feel strong enough to come to claim his father's old possessions.

Dā'ūd's son Qara Arslan, who had succeeded his father at Ḥiṣn Kaifā, had already been decisively defeated the year before Zangī's death by Temūr-Tash's troops<sup>(3)</sup> and although Qara Arslan's fortunes also rose with the removal of Zangī and accession of Saif al-Dīn Ghāzī,<sup>(4)</sup> it is clear that Qara Arslan soon recognised the overall suzerainty of Temūr-Tash.<sup>(5)</sup>

Temūr-Tash received a temporary setback in 543/1148-9 when he endured a humiliating defeat at the hands of Saif al-Dīn Ghāzī who came as far as Mārdīn to regain Zangī's territories.<sup>(6)</sup> This son of Zangī was not, however, destined to bother Temūr-Tash for long since Saif al-Dīn died the following year (544/1149) at Mosul.<sup>(7)</sup>

The remaining few years of Temūr-Tash's reign were a period of genuine, if modest, power in the immediate area of Diyār Bakr. He obtained a recognition of his own suzerainty from the lord of Āmid<sup>(8)</sup> and acquired new territories, such as

(1) Ibn al-Athīr, *Atābegs*, 79.

(2) Ms. A, f. 172b.

(3) *Ibid.*, f. 171a.

(4) Qara Arslan acquired all the fortresses which Zangī had taken from his father Dā'ūd (Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 172b). Cf. also Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 268.

(5) This is the interpretation which may be placed on Temūr-Tash's action in taking Is'ird and then handing it back to Qara Arslan a little later (Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 173a).

(6) Ibn al-Athīr, *Atābegs*, 91; Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 172b; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 275.

(7) Ibn al-Athīr, *Atābegs*, 92.

(8) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 176a.

Sumaisāṭ in 544/1149-50 <sup>(1)</sup> when the ruler of Edessa, Joscelin, was taken prisoner by Nūr al-Dīn.

All the evidence points to Temūr-Tash's enjoyment of considerable local power before his death and to his being recognised as the most powerful ruler in Diyār Bakr. His brief but disastrous interlude at Aleppo when he was still a young man was his only real taste of power outside Diyār Bakr. An analysis of his whole policy testifies to a definite decision on his part to restrict his aspirations to the maintenance of his two cities of Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn and to the acquisition of whatever territories he could retain within a modest distance of his base at Mārdīn. A negative appraisal of his rule could pinpoint a lack of energy and ambition or even—as Ibn al-Athīr suggests <sup>(2)</sup>—a life given over to pleasurable pursuits. More positively, however, his policies could be viewed as realistic and realisable.

In view of the evidence presented in the above discussion and the personality of Temūr-Tash himself, who generally appears to have preferred negotiation to acts of sudden aggression, it is difficult to understand how the extraordinary but surely apocryphal story of Temūr-Tash at Jerusalem continues to be treated seriously by Western historians of the Crusades.

According to this anecdote, which comes from William of Tyre, and only from him, Temūr-Tash made a sudden attack on Jerusalem with his bands of Turcomans, prompted by a desire to regain the lands once owned by his grandfather, Artuq. This story is treated seriously by Weil, <sup>(3)</sup> Rohricht <sup>(4)</sup> and Stevenson <sup>(5)</sup> and is allowed to remain unchallenged even by as recent a historian as Runciman. <sup>(6)</sup>

(1) *Ibid.*, f. 175a; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 297.

(2) *Atābegs*, 79.

(3) Weil, *op. cit.*, 296.

(4) R. Röhrich, *Geschichte des Königreichs Jerusalem (1100-1291)* (Innsbruck, 1898), 271.

(5) Stevenson, *op. cit.*, 171.

(6) S. Runciman, *A History of the Crusades. II. The Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Frankish East 1100-1187* (Cambridge, 1954), 337.

According to Stevenson,<sup>(1)</sup> this anecdote from William of Tyre calls the invader of Jerusalem “Hiaroquin”. The identification of this name with Temūr-Tash is Wilken’s.<sup>(2)</sup> Whether or not such an identification is linguistically feasible, it is entirely out of character that Temūr-Tash should make this sudden, hare-brained and arduous foray towards Jerusalem. It is unwise, in any case, to treat as sacrosanct a narrative which appears only in this one source. If such a raid did indeed take place, then, directed as it was against Jerusalem—a prime bone of contention between Muslim and Frank in the twelfth century—it would surely have found some echo in Muslim and other Western sources.<sup>(3)</sup> Temūr-Tash’s only audacious “coup” for which more than one account exists is an isolated reference to his capture of a caravan at Edessa in 533/1138-9.<sup>(4)</sup> Whilst this incident, and his capture of a modest share of Joscelin’s possessions—in which other neighbouring rulers also participated—testify to certain territorial ambitions they pale into insignificance beside a raid on Jerusalem itself.

### VIII. *The administration of Temur-Tash*

Ibn al-Azraq, and to a much lesser extent Ibn al-Athīr, make isolated references to aspects of social and economic life in the reign of Temūr-Tash. It would, however, be foolhardy to make anything other than very tentative statements on the basis of such remarks as are found in the sources. Such wider issues as the inter-relationship between towns and the nomadic groups present in the area of Diyār Bakr, as well as the treatment of the Christians, who probably outnumbered the Muslims in Temūr-Tash’s reign, must remain almost entirely undiscussed through lack of information.

(1) *Op. cit.*, 171, n. 2.

(2) F. Wilken, *Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Leipzig, 1807-32), IV, 17.

(3) Röhrich draws attention to this fact but does not in so doing cast doubts on the veracity of the anecdote (*op. cit.*, 271, n. 2).

(4) Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 246; Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 169a; *Anonymous Syriac Chronicle*, 278.

Certain concrete facts about Temür-Tash's domestic policy emerge from Ibn al-Azraq's history. He removed the remaining local resistance to him with his capture in 531/1136-7 of Hattākh, the last remaining Marwānid possession in Diyār Bakr.<sup>(1)</sup> Individual members of the Marwānid family were, however, subsequently employed by Temür-Tash.<sup>(2)</sup>

There is evidence of an interest in civil as well as military building, which testifies to Temür-Tash's desire to put down roots in the area of Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn. For Mārdīn, Ibn al-Azraq mentions the construction of a family tomb for the Artuqid family where the bodies of Il-Ghāzī and Sulaimān were eventually housed.<sup>(3)</sup> The mosque at Mayyāfāriqīn was rebuilt after its dome collapsed in 547/1152-3.<sup>(4)</sup> The most ambitious building project, however, was clearly the construction of the Qaramān bridge which was begun in 541/1146-7, completed in 548/1153-4 and was clearly a most impressive edifice.<sup>(5)</sup>

It is impossible to determine the exact religious allegiance of Temür-Tash, although his warm reception of an Ismā'īlī *shaikh* is described in great detail by Ibn al-Azraq. Perhaps the elaborate deference which he accorded this *shaikh* testifies to the latter's personal magnetism rather than to any deep-rooted religious inclination towards the Ismā'īlī creed. This *shaikh* eventually lost his hold over Temür-Tash and left him.<sup>(6)</sup>

The evidence on commercial matters is also very slight. It is interesting to note that towards the end of his reign Temür-Tash minted coins.<sup>(7)</sup> This one minting of copper coins is

(1) Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, 264; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, *Mir'āt*, 161; Ibn al-Furāt, *Duwal*, f. 93b.

(2) 'Awaḍ, 254.

(3) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 171a.

(4) *Ibid.*, f. 175a.

(5) *Ibid.*, ff. 171a-b, f. 179b. After the death of Temür-Tash his son, Najm al-Dīn Alpī, completed the work on the bridge, which became the model for other bridges in the area, especially the one built by Fakhr al-Dīn Qara Arslan on the Tigris at Hışn Kaifā (Ms. A, f. 179b).

(6) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 171b.

(7) *Ibid.*, f. 172b. Cf. S. Lane-Poole, *The Coins of the Turkman Houses of Seljook, Urtuk, Zengee, etc. in the British Museum* (London, 1877), 139-40.

revealing on two counts. Firstly, it is an indication that some kind of trading took place with neighbouring areas.<sup>(1)</sup> This was no doubt facilitated by the discovery in the reign of Temūr-Tash of a copper mine north of Mayyāfāriqīn.<sup>(2)</sup> Secondly, it is a sign that Temūr-Tash had at least begun to assume some of the trappings of a traditional Muslim ruler—rather than those of a semi-nomadic chief. The fact that he did not strike gold coins which would have had a more than local currency is itself significant. Even in his arrogation to himself of the right to *siqqa*, Temūr-Tash retained his customary local bias.

The civilian inhabitants of the area of Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn were probably well-treated. Ibn al-Azraq's biased testimony states that Temūr-Tash behaved kindly towards the local '*ulamā*' and the important indigenous families.<sup>(3)</sup> Ibn al-Athīr reveals that Temūr-Tash appropriated in taxation only a tenth of the revenue from the harvests in comparison with Zangī who said that if it were necessary he would be prepared to levy as much as two-thirds for his important military commitments.<sup>(4)</sup>

Allusions to Temūr-Tash's treatment of the Christian population are all too rare. As well as the possibility mentioned in Ibn al-Azraq's text that Ibn Mukhtār, one of his officials, was a Christian,<sup>(5)</sup> a possibility which Cahen sees as a certainty,<sup>(6)</sup> Michael the Syrian relates that Temūr-Tash did not treat the Christians well but that at the end of his reign he repented.<sup>(7)</sup> Michael the Syrian is as capable of biased testimony as Ibn al-Azraq and it is difficult to assess the full significance of this one statement.

The frequent changes of vizier and other officials faithfully

(1) Copper coins were commonly those intended for local use. The lack of silver is not surprising; the Near East at this time was in the throes of a silver famine.

(2) Ibn al-Athīr, *Kāmil*, X, 215.

(3) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 176b.

(4) *Atābegs*, 79.

(5) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 173a.

(6) "Diyār Bakr", 268.

(7) *Chronique*, 311.



recorded by Ibn al-Azraq are not remarkable for the time. They are an indication of administrative malpractices prevalent among the Artuqids and other contemporary dynasties.

The major achievement of Temür-Tash was his ability to hold on to Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn in this troubled period and to bring some measure of stability to these two cities. A rather belated recognition of this achievement was made by the caliph in 547/1152-3, the year before Temür-Tash died. Robes of honour and an edict entitling him to the land arrived for him.<sup>(1)</sup> This event is mentioned without comment by Ibn al-Azraq, although it is very significant that Temür-Tash only received official recognition from Baghdad thirty years after his taking possession of Mārdīn. This may be an indication of the relatively unimportant status accorded him by the caliph and the sultan. It may also reveal that Temür-Tash enjoyed real power in Diyār Bakr only towards the very end of his reign, a fact which is demonstrably proved by historical events. As Ibn al-Azraq's panegyric expresses it:

"After Zangī (had been killed), no *amīr* other than Ḥusām al-Dīn (Temür-Tash) remained independent, unopposed, unchallenged and governing alone".<sup>(2)</sup>

To balance this glowing testimony to Temür-Tash's achievements it should be added that whilst many medieval Muslim historians record the death of his father, Il-Ghāzī, his own death passes unmentioned except by a few sources.<sup>(3)</sup>

### IX. *Conclusions*

With the accession of Temür-Tash in 516/1122-3 at Mārdīn and 518/1124-5 at Mayyāfāriqīn, the territorial ambitions of the Artuqids shrank to the purely local area of the Jazīra. Temür-Tash was fortunate to survive for thirty years during a period which was dominated by the monumental figure of Zangī.


(1) Ibn al-Azraq, Ms. A, f. 175a.

(2) *Ibid.*

(3) Ibn al-Qalānisi, *Dhail*, 329; Bundārī, *Zubdat*, 244; Ibn al-Athīr, *Alābēgs*, 106; Sibṭ b. al-Jauzī, *Mir'āt*, 218-9.

Locally, Temür-Tash was dwarfed by his cousin Dā'ūd and enjoyed a brief interlude of genuine power in Diyār Bakr only in the last few years of his life, when both Zangī and Dā'ūd had died. Broadly speaking, his successors also retained the local emphasis of his polity. The death of Il-Ghāzī in 516/1122-3 could have ended Artuqid hopes of acquiring for themselves a portion of Islamic territory as their permanent domain. With the succession of Temür-Tash at Mārdīn and Mayyāfāriqīn, a dynasty was firmly established and, against all odds, maintained itself in that same area until the early fifteenth century.

Carole HILLENBRAND  
(Edinburgh, U.K.)



KEY : ——— attested by Ibn al-Azraq.

( ) not mentioned by Ibn al-Azraq.

---- genealogy more doubtful.

*The genealogy of the early Artuqids*

